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CHAPTER 11'S EXPANDING UNIVERSE
Douglas G. Baird
In their 1990 pathbreaking study in the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review,' Lynn LoPucki and Bill Whitford were the first to provide a clear
picture of large corporate reorganizations. They encountered a universe with a
population of forty-three cases. Today it numbers more than a thousand, and it
has evolved as it has expanded. One can take stock of how things have changed
using the Bankruptcy Research Database (BRD), the tool that grew out of
LoPucki and Whitford's study. The BRD is the first source to which everyone
turns to understand large bankruptcies.2 With hundreds of data fields for every
case, it provides a window into the world of corporate reorganizations. It offers a
synoptic view of how large reorganizations work and how they have changed
over time.
Long before others noticed them, LoPucki and Whitford flagged the issues
that dominate reorganization debates today. They showed that, even in the
1980s, asset sales were "already a common feature of Chapter 11 cases."3 They
highlighted the practice of those filing petitions choosing a forum that suits
them.4 Recidivism is another problem they identified. Prepackaged bankruptcy
is another phenomenon that they isolated. With the help of the BRD, it is
possible to trace the evolution of what have become the most salient features of
modern Chapter 11.
Observing change, however, is only a first step. One of the central lessons of
Bill Whitford's work, both in his collaboration with LoPucki and elsewhere, is
the one the Wisconsin School imparts more generally. Naked statistics alone are
not enough to take the pulse of legal phenomena. They provide rigor and
structure, but interviews and close examination of the facts are essential to
understanding what is going on. This is especially the case in bankruptcy. Then,
as now, it is a closed universe in which a relatively small handful of lawyers
* Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago. I am grateful to Lynn
LoPucki for his help. Daniel Marcin assisted me on the empirical work. The John M. Olin Fund
provided research support.
1. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125 (1990).
2. I count myself among the many to have benefited enormously from the BRD. See, e.g.,
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673 (2003). My
students have used it as well. See, e.g., Ramanadh V. Chivukula, Critical Vendors and Bankruptcy
(Mar. 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago Booth School of Business).
3. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597, 600 (1993).
4. Thirty percent of their cases were filed distant from corporate headquarters. Lynn M.
LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 11, 29.
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develop practices largely invisible to outsiders.5 This is a world in which law and
norms evolve together. This Essay sketches out some of the lines of inquiry that
the BRD invites, but does not completely answer.
Although many bankruptcy debates have focused on the question of
priority, it has become increasingly clear in recent years that the more relevant
question for bankruptcy reform centers around control rights. It is the battle for
control rather than competing theories of priority that tells the story of change in
large reorganization practice over the last two decades. A number of academics
have begun to talk about the importance of control in the last decade or so,6 but
LoPucki and Whitford recognized the importance of the issue long before
anyone else. Their examination of large cases showed that debates about
absolute priority are a "tempest in a teapot."7 Deviations from absolute priority
were not the main event. More important is the way the law and the norms of
bankruptcy and corporate law affect those who have their hands on the levers of
corporate governance.
I. TRENDS IN THE BANKRUPTCY RESEARCH DATABASE
From the filing of Penn-Dixie to the recent filing of Energy Futures
Holding, the BRD now includes more than one thousand cases.8 To observe
changes in large bankruptcy cases over time in the BRD, I group them into seven
cohorts of five years each. LoPucki and Whitford's initial study overlaps with the
first two cohorts.9 This breakdown of large bankruptcy cases shows potential
patterns and identifies the issues worth pursuing further.
5. LoPucki and Whitford found the practice of bankruptcy highly concentrated. Only a handful
of small firms handled large corporate reorganizations. Levin & Weintraub and Stutman, Triester &
Glatt represent almost a third of all the firms in their initial sample. Large firms such as Weil, Gotshal
& Manges and Sidley & Austin also handled multiple cases in their sample, but though these firms
were large, the bankruptcy practice within them consisted of small teams. The reorganization lawyers
at Weil, Gotshal had worked together at Seligson & Morris. See Michael Y. Park, A Minor Deity in the
Bankruptcy Arena, N.Y. METRO AREA SUPER LAWYERS, Sept. 2009, available at http://www.super
lawyers.com/new-york-metro/article/A-Minor-Deity-in-the-Bankruptcy-Arenalddf25722-fbl7-4ad5-
9619-7flaea9bb5e5.html. Similarly, Sidley & Austin's bankruptcy practice was centered around
lawyers who worked together at Shutan & Trost, another small boutique bankruptcy shop. Large firms
have largely displaced small ones, but the number of lawyers around whom the reorganization practice
is built remains quite small and stable. Harvey Miller, for example, was at the center of Weil's
reorganization practice from the early 1970s until well into this decade.
6. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and the
Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921 (2001); Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795 (2004).
7. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 1, at 126.
8. I use the December 2014 version of BRD in this Essay.
9. LoPucki and Whitford included in their sample the large cases that had concluded by March
1988. This does not include all the cases in the first cohort as some were still ongoing, and it excludes
many in the second cohort. In addition, three of the forty-three cases were later dropped from the
BRD as its protocols were refined. When I provide summary statistics for LoPucki and Whitford (as
opposed to the five-year cohorts), I use only these forty cases. Dropping these three cases makes the
comparisons consistent with other cases in the BRD. In addition, it allows me to use data in the BRD
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One must exercise caution and not draw conclusions too quickly. Each of
the seven cohorts is different. For example, more than 20% of the cases involved
retail businesses in the 1990s, but fewer than 10% of those filed from 1985 to
1989 and from 2005 to 2009 were retail businesses. Similarly, many of the large
reorganizations between 2000 and 2004 are casualties from the collapse of the
dot-com bubble. The distribution of this cohort's Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) codes reflect this.1 0 To bring what is happening into sharper
focus, it is necessary to hold these and other features constant and treat summary
statistics with skepticism. Nevertheless, patterns quickly emerge that invite
further inquiry.
The phenomenon of firms emerging from bankruptcy only to refile again
has been remarkably stable over time, with the exception of the second half of
the 1990s. The number of firms that enter bankruptcy a second time within five
years of emerging from bankruptcy ranged between 4% and 15% over the last
three and a half decades in every cohort but one. During the late 1990s it jumped
to almost 20%.
There are no obvious changes that explain why recidivism would rise so
much during this one period. It was 12% in the cohort before and 9% in the
cohort after. The total number of cases filed did not change. The relative shares
of retailing, manufacturing, and transportation firms remained unchanged from
the first half of the 1990s until the second half. The total number of prepackaged
and prenegotiated plans was higher during this period than at any other time, but
this change alone does not explain the difference.11
One might cut the data differently.1 2 The number of refilings might rise if
courts were more likely to confirm plans in the first place instead of liquidating
firms. If more of the weaker cases are confirmed, then the surviving firms might
be less healthy. The percentage of cases that refile should go up. To account for
this effect, one might look at the total number of refilings relative to the total
number of cases filed (instead of the number of refilings relative to the number
of cases that emerge). By this measure, the contrast is less striking, but the late
1990s still appears very much an outlier.
Here is a puzzle that bears scrutiny. It is possible that the spike in the late
1990s is both benign and uninteresting, but closer study might shed additional
light on the problem of jurisdictional competition. By LoPucki's account, this
was the era in which other jurisdictions began to compete with Delaware and the
for these cases that were not reported in their initial study. Including these three additional cases,
however, would not affect the observations here in any way worth noting.
10. To be concrete, 26% of the large cases were in the SIC industry group containing
transportation, electric, and communication services. In most cohorts, the percentage was 12% or less.
It reached 18% and 16% in two other cohorts.
11. The number of cases that were either prepackaged or prenegotiated was 34% during this
period. In the cohort before and after, it was 26% and 28% respectively.
12. See Lynn LoPucki, Changes in Chapter 11 Success Levels Since 1980, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 989,
1008 fig.6 (2015) (examining the five-year refilling rates from 1984 to 2008).
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Southern District of New York. 13 We might have found ourselves in a period of
disequilibrium. Judges during this period might have been willing to approve
plans that were too risky, but they learned their lesson and the rate of refilings
returned to its natural level. This hypothesis may be right or wrong, but it is
worth further study.
Apart from this recidivism puzzle, what is most manifest from even the most
cursory review of the different cohorts is a massive transformation that took
place in the 1990s. Chapter 11s took much less time. The median Chapter 11
lasted about 900 days during the 1980s. But beginning in the 1990s until the
present, the median ranged between 460 and 605 days.1 4 Sales began to rise in
the mid-1990s. Only 4% to 7% of the cases filed before 1995 are going-concern
sales under § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. They rose to nearly 20% in the five
years before 2000, and have hovered around 25% since then.
Prepackaged bankruptcies are contemplated in the Bankruptcy Code itself,
but there were none in the first five years under the Bankruptcy Code and only
one in the next five years. Between 1990 and 1994, however, 19% of all cases
filed were prepackaged. During the next five years, prenegotiated plans became
more common and, to some extent, appear to displace prepacked bankruptcies.
Prepackaged bankruptcies fell to 13% of all cases; prenegotiated plans increased
from 7% of all cases filed to a little more than 20%. Between 1990 and 2009,
prepackaged and prearranged bankruptcy constituted between 26% and 34% of
all cases filed. Since 2010, 44% were prepackaged or prearranged. One cannot
tell yet from the data alone whether this is a onetime increase (perhaps because
of the financial crisis) or whether it reflects a lasting change.
The 1990s also brought a decline in the percentage of cases that emerged
from Chapter 11. Between 1980 and 1994, the rate of emergence ranged between
76% and 88%. By contrast, between 1995 and 2014, it was never more than 65%.
It is possible that there is some important change in the types of cases that were
filed or the way that they were treated. One hypothesis is that bankruptcy judges
were tougher in later years. They were unwilling to confirm plans that allowed
firms to emerge when they had too little chance to succeed. But this explanation
seems implausible given that, as noted, recidivism rates have remained more or
less constant with the exception of the 1994-1999 cohort.' 5
It is also possible that there are industry effects at work. During some
periods, the types of firms that file might also be those that were less likely to
emerge. An Internet firm that needs Chapter 11 to sort out its financial mess
might be less likely to remain intact as a going concern, but this does not mean
that Chapter 11 was inappropriate or done less ably. This explanation, however,
seems unlikely as well, as the distribution of types of firms does not change
noticeably between the two periods. There seems to be more variation among
13. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005).
14. For these purposes, I am focusing only on cases that were neither prepackaged nor
prearranged. Include these cases, and the duration falls even more in the later periods.
15. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
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the cohorts between 1980 and 1994 on the one hand and 1995 to 2014 on the
other than there is between the two different time periods.
Perhaps the most striking contrast between practice in the 1980s and today
is the role of old equity. Old equity actively participated in cases during the
1980s. Half of the cases LoPucki and Whitford studied had equity committees. 16
Only one in five had them in the first half of the 1990s, and only about one in ten
since then. More striking, LoPucki and Whitford found that there was a
distribution to equity in more than 75% of the cases they studied. Distributions
to equity were commonplace even when the firm was manifestly insolvent. In
every case in which general creditors received at least fourteen cents on the
dollar, equity received something. This is no longer the case. By the early 2000s,
equity commonly received nothing in the vast majority of cases.17
The small payout to unsecured creditors explains part of why equityholders
fare so poorly under existing practice. Unsecured creditors received forty-one
cents on the dollar in the median case filed before 1995. Afterwards, their share
fell to 13%. But this itself does not explain everything. Even when distributions
to unsecured creditors fell as low as 13% in a given case during the 1980s, equity
often received something. This does not happen any more.
In short, these summary statistics suggest that the 1990s was a time of
transformation. Chapter 11s became quicker, going-concern sales rose
dramatically, the number of firms entering with at least some kind of agreement
among major stakeholders became commonplace, the number of firms that
emerged successfully fell, and payouts to equity became smaller. Because all
these changes occur at roughly the same time, it naturally leads to the question
of whether there is some underlying force that is driving these effects.
Using any large database requires understanding how the data are
assembled and how the various fields are defined. One needs to be aware of
what each category means. I have argued elsewhere, for example, that the BRD
understates the number of firms that are transferred in bankruptcy as a going
concern. Ed Lampert's acquisition of Kmart during its Chapter 11, for example,
does not count as a sale under the BRD's protocols because, instead of buying
the assets outright, Lampert bought the fulcrum security and then put in place a
plan that gave him the equity of the reorganized company. From the perspective
of the old stakeholders, there was little difference between what happened in
Kmart and an outright sale." But for present purposes, the absolute number of
sales is not the focus, but rather their relative change over time. As long as the
methodology is consistent, one can usually identify trends even if one believes
that the data understate (or overstate) the relevant phenomenon.
16. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 1, at 137-38.
17. The BRD does not gather comprehensive data on distributions to equity, perhaps because
the phenomenon is empirically so unimportant today. In another study, Bob Rasmussen and I found
that equity was unequivocally left with nothing in seventeen out of twenty-three cases that emerged
from bankruptcy in 2002. In only one case did equity receive anything when an insolvent business
entered bankruptcy without a preexisting deal in place. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 692
n.65.
18. See id. at 698.
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Nevertheless, one must still bear in mind exactly what is being measured.
Fewer firms "emerged" in the mid-1990s, but this does not mean that the
outcomes became worse. A firm can enter Chapter 11 and sell its assets to
another buyer in the industry. If operations are combined such that the
reorganized firm loses its own identity, then the firm has not "emerged" as that
term is defined in the BRD, even though the assets are being put to their highest
valued use and no one has lost her job. By the same token, it is not necessary for
the core business of a firm to remain intact for it to satisfy the definition of
emerge. Eastern counts as a firm that successfully emerged from bankruptcy.
To return to LoPucki and Whitford's original sample, although only 10% of
firms failed to emerge from Chapter 11, 45% shattered subsequently and failed
to maintain their core business. 19 Even when a firm "emerges," it is common for
the number of jobs to decline sharply during the course of the reorganization. 20
With these cautions in mind, it is possible to suggest some ways to tie the
changes of the 1990s together. The increase in sales seems a large part of the
story. During the 1980s, senior creditors did not see Chapter 11 as an agreeable
forum for the sale of their collateral. Indeed, LoPucki and Whitford have three
cases in their study in which the stakeholders planned on a liquidating sale of the
assets only after the bankruptcy was over.21
The willingness of bankruptcy courts to approve the sale of substantially all
assets even in pieces might have increased during the 1990s. Such a change
would increase the number of sales, shorten the length of each case, and reduce
the number of firms that emerged. In the 1990s, creditors who had leverage over
the debtor might therefore have become more willing to use bankruptcy as a
forum to sell assets. This in turn might have led to the rise in prenegotiated and
prearranged bankruptcies that we see. And in such cases in which creditors plan
asset sales, equityholders can expect to fare less well. When assets are converted
into cash, it is harder for equityholders to claim that there is value for them.
No doubt sales have been important. Also important was the increasing
power of creditors. With rule changes in the early 1990s, it became much easier
to consolidate claims. 22 It may have taken creditors a decade or so to see how to
use the Bankruptcy Code to their advantage. Creditor power also expanded as
courts interpreting the Code's adequate protection provisions made it harder for
debtors to obtain priming liens or use cash collateral. This may not exhaust all
the possible explanations. In the next Section of this Essay, I want to suggest one
19. The term "shattered" is the one that LoPucki and Whitford used to describe these firms. See
LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 3, at 602.
20. The decline, however, seems to be decreasing over time. It is 44% and 50% in the first two
cohorts, but ranges from 19% to 28% in all the cohorts thereafter.
21. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 3, at 603 n.22.
22. The rules governing the trading of claims loosened substantially in the early 1990s and the
amount of claims trading increased substantially. See W. Andrew P. Logan III, Claims Trading: The
Need for Further Amending Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001 (e)(2), 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REv. 495, 501-02 (1994) (describing the decision of the Rules Committee to remove claims trading
from judicial oversight to promote a liquid market in claims).
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more force, one driven by norms rather than the letter of the law, that might
have also been at work.
II. DIRECTORS AND STAKEHOLDERS
The initial mystery LoPucki and Whitford confronted in their study was
their finding that in many cases there were distributions to equityholders that
were out of step with their entitlements under the absolute priority rule. Plans
were regularly confirmed in which equityholders were given an amount greater
than what it would cost to cram them down and leave them nothing. Moreover,
distributions went to equityholders even when there was no active committee.
The equityholders who were dispersed and quiescent still enjoyed payouts.
LoPucki and Whitford found that part of the explanation was entirely
pragmatic. There was the fear on the part of the directors and officers that, if
they gave equityholders nothing, they would become energized and "kick sand in
our faces." 23 But their interviews showed that more was at work. A central part
of the story they tell, based on their interviews, is that the officers and directors
believed that their duties included looking out for the interests of equity.
When LoPucki and Whitford did their interviews in the 1980s, they found
that directors and officers saw part of their jobs to protect shareholders even
when it was clear they were out of the money. Over time, this may have changed.
New regulations, the market for corporate control, and the additional levers that
creditors possess, quite apart from their direct effects, may have the independent
effect of making the directors more inclined to look at the firm as a whole and all
of its investors, and not just the shareholders.
The board operates inside a protected envelope. As long as each director
acts within this large volume shielded by the duty of care and the duty of loyalty,
she is free to do what she thinks best.24 The exact dimensions of this envelope
have changed over time, but as long as directors and officers pay attention and
have no conflicts of interest, they are largely unconstrained. There is very little
any constituency can do to force a court to second-guess such decisions.
There is remarkably little guidance about how the board is supposed to
navigate conflicts across different stakeholders, but the way boards understood
their jobs may have changed over time. Fifty years ago, directors of large
corporations were often relatively passive and inclined to do the bidding of the
existing CEO. It became clear in the early 1990s, however, that, at least when the
firm was financially distressed, shareholders could not prevent directors from
taking account of the interests of creditors. 25 The courts made it clear that it was
23. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 1, at 184.
24. Moreover, many corporations have insulated directors from any personal liability for failure
to exercise business judgment. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015).
25. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL
277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). As later cases made plain, it is one thing to say that a shareholder
cannot prevent directors from looking after the interests of creditors when the firm is insolvent and
quite another to say that a creditor can bring an action against the directors for failing to look after
their interests. See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92,
101 (Del. 2007).
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quite wrong to think that board members were bound to favor equityholders to
the exclusion of others. Directors today therefore may think differently.
Directors today may be more likely to see their duties as going to the firm as a
whole, rather than to existing management and equityholders.
Board members are entirely free to take steps that have the effect of wiping
out equity completely. This happens, for example, every time the board approves
the filing of a voluntary prepackaged bankruptcy that gives equity nothing. By
the same token, creditors have little ability to hold the directors directly liable
for failing to look out for their interests. They may be able to bring derivative
actions, but Delaware courts have made it plain that the duty of directors is to
the firm as a whole. Directors have a "duty to maximize the value of the ...
corporation for the benefit of all those having an interest in it." 26 They must look
to the underlying merits, but within very broad boundaries they are free to do
what they think best.
A director who asserts that she is taking a course that is not maximizing the
value of the firm's assets, whether for the benefit of shareholders or anyone else,
is asking for trouble, 27 but she is most unlikely to encounter difficulty
otherwise-even if a decision is likely to have little effect other than benefit one
investor at the expense of another.
Quadrant Structured Products Co. v. Vertin,28 a 2014 Delaware case,
illustrates the range of discretion that directors enjoy. Athilon was an insolvent
company in the course of liquidating its assets. It had no business other than
holding a portfolio of securities. The directors decided to sell some of the
securities and use the proceeds to purchase a bundle of securities with a higher
yield and potentially a higher volatility. In an efficient capital market, the only ex
ante effect of such a decision is to benefit junior creditors at the expense of
senior creditors. Because there are always costs associated with the sale of a
security, the transfer had the effect of making the firm as a whole slightly worse
off.
There is no reason to believe that the more volatile portfolio was the more
valuable one. Indeed, there was every reason to think the directors made the
exchange to advantage the junior creditors. Indeed, the junior creditors had
acquired control of the firm and had picked its directors. Nevertheless, a
Delaware Chancellor does not second-guess such decisions. It is enough that, in
less than perfect markets, one portfolio might be more valuable than the other.
Markets are imperfect, and two bundles of securities trading at the same
price might not be worth the same. Directors are free to exercise their judgment
26. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 103. The director stands in a position analogous to a trustee of a
trust whose beneficiaries have conflicting interests. In the law of trusts, the trustee's obligation is to
"act impartially and with due regard for the diverse beneficial interests created by the terms of the
trust." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79(1)(a) (2003).
27. It is worth recalling that Lionel is exactly such a case. The Second Circuit disapproved a sale
of publicly traded securities, but only because the board conspicuously failed to identify any purpose
in making the sale other than to please one group of investors at the expense of another. See Comm. of
Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1066 (2d Cir. 1983).
28. 102 A.3d 155 (Del. Ch. 2014).
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about which of two investments is worth more. The disappointed investors could
not get past a motion to dismiss. Quadrant is a case in which the directors'
decision favors the junior investors, but the logic of the opinion applies equally if
the senior creditors were in control and the directors made investment decisions
that favored them.
The way in which the duties of directors are voiced in Delaware may itself
have influenced the way that directors view their role. The courts now emphasize
that the directors must look to the interests of the firm as a whole, rather than
the interests of the shareholders. 29 Directors might take their cue from such
decisions, even if doing so has no effect on their potential liability. Directors may
focus more on maximizing the value of the business rather than the interests of
any particular constituents simply because they now have a different
understanding of their jobs.
Other forces are also at work. CEO turnover is much higher. Average
tenure is now six years. In an earlier era, it was much longer. As a result, more
directors have picked the CEO, rather than vice versa.30 They feel less beholden
to her. Throughout this period the number of independent directors is rising.
Only 10% of directors are insiders today. In 1950, it was close to half.31 Some is
this change is the result of regulatory intervention. In 2003, the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act required that a majority of the board consist of independent directors. Audit
committees must consist entirely of independent directors. The New York Stock
Exchange now requires entirely independent nominating and compensation
committees. 32
Boards of large corporations even into the 1970s were largely insulated
from external pressures. Today there is a market for corporate control. Hedge
funds appear and insist on action. Modern lenders have covenants they can use
to effect changes in the way the firm operates. 33 Creditors may insist on the
retention of a turnaround firm or the installation of a chief restructuring
officer.34 Their presence changes the relationship of the board to the firm as
well. They give the board a different perspective on the firm.
These changes have likely affected the way boards approach Chapter 11.
The modern director of a hopelessly insolvent firm may be more likely to believe
that equityholders are entitled to less consideration. Once a firm is sufficiently
insolvent, it does not belong to the equityholders anymore.35 If directors were
29. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
30. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEx. L. REv. 987, 1032 (2010).
31. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1468, 1473 n.9 (2007).
32. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 30, at 1023.
33. See Greg Nini, David C. Smith & Amir Sufi, Creditor Control Rights, Corporate
Governance, and Firm Value, 25 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 1713 (2012).
34. If we look at the forty most recent large cases in which plans have been confirmed, 35%
have employed turnaround firms who do repeat business with large creditors; 15% have chief
restructuring officers actually installed.
35. This is not to say that modern directors ignore shareholder interests the moment a firm
becomes insolvent. The equity of an insolvent firm still retains option value, and directors should take
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focused on maximizing value, it would explain why the cases were faster. The
changing perception of directors of their responsibility might also explain the rise
in prepacks and prearranged plans. Directors might be more willing to work with
creditors in advance of bankruptcy to craft a restructuring plan. A change in the
director's outlook might also explain why there were more sales.36 Indeed, the
directors might have become more likely to consider value-maximizing sales,
even ones that left existing CEOs without jobs. This could explain the decline in
the number of cases that emerged from Chapter 11.37
In short, changes in the way that directors and officers regard their own
responsibilities may be partially responsible for the changes that we see in the
BRD. It would be worthwhile to explore the way in which directors perceive
their own responsibilities and how these have changed over time. The thought
experiment is to imagine how a responsible, attentive, and independent director
perceives her own responsibilities.
At the same time, such thoughts need to be tempered with data, and the
BRD collects comprehensive data on the fate of the CEO. Obvious patterns here
do not emerge from the summary statistics. It might seem that greater creditor
control would lead to more CEOs being dismissed, but once one controls for
whether the firm itself survived, the speed with which CEOs have departed has
not changed in a way that is manifest. Of all the data fields in the BRD, this one
is the one most worthy of close scrutiny. It is data not collected elsewhere, it is
comprehensive. Patterns likely lurk beneath the surface and understanding them
would shed light on the dynamics of modern reorganization practice.
Academic discussions of the duties of corporate directors spend entirely too
much time on how much legal rules constrain the director's discretion. Too little
attention is spent on the question of what directors should do. It is one thing to
tell a director that an individual creditor cannot sue her directly for violating a
duty owed her. It is quite another to tell a director how to think about the best
way to discharge her obligations as a director when the firm is insolvent and the
interests of different investors have to be traded off against each other. In trying
to think about this enterprise, it would be useful to see how directors and officers
think about their own responsibilities and whether they have changed since the
time LoPucki and Whitford did their original study.
account of it until there is a day of reckoning. As discussed in the next Section, nothing requires
bankruptcy regimes to be a day of reckoning that treats the reorganization as the equivalent of a
hypothetical sale. A coherent law of corporate reorganizations can recognize the option value of every
investor's stake in the firm. See Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors' Bargain and Option-Preservation
Priority in Chapter 11, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 759 (2011).
36. One needs to be cautious about sales, given the empirical evidence of possible inefficiencies
associated with sales. See Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in
Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511 (2009); Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy
Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2007).
37. Again, one needs to be cautious, as the BRD shows only a decline in the number of cases
that emerged. It is not certain that the decline is due to an increase in the number of sales in which the
firm did not survive as a going concern. Nor does the BRD have any data that suggests such sales
maximized value.
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III. IRRELEVANCE OF PRIORITY
LoPucki and Whitford show that departures from absolute priority in the
1980s were never dramatic. The empirical evidence suggests that variations from
absolute priority have fallen over time.38 One also needs to be cautious about
reported departures from absolute priority. A plan in which senior creditors
consent to give value to junior creditors may result not from a failure on the part
of judges to adhere strictly to absolute priority, but the opposite. A secured
creditor may agree to receive less than full payment because its lien is
vulnerable. If a secured creditor has a 10% chance of losing an avoidance action,
a consensual plan under which it is paid only 90% of its secured claim is simply a
settlement that reflects the value of its priority right. A lien that is subject to
attack is not worth as much as one that is bulletproof.
The benefits of priority are elusive. Sophisticated creditors receive, after
adjusting for the risks, the market return on the capital they contribute to the
enterprise. A secured creditor whose priority right is limited in bad states of the
world will adjust accordingly. 39 There may be some consequences to limiting
priority. To the extent that a hierarchical capital structure brings benefits, 40 these
are lost when priority rights are slighted. But these costs are modest to the extent
that departures from absolute priority are small. The evidence suggests that they
always have been. To quote LoPucki and Whitford, priority itself may be "a
tempest in a teapot." 41
Modern Chapter 11 practice is frequently a contest between sophisticated
investors. There are, to be sure, some large Chapter 11s in which the
renegotiation of collective bargaining agreements is a central issue. But as the
economy changes and the level of unionization in the private, for-profit sector
declines, it has become a smaller part of the picture. Mass tort cases or those in
which fraud or pension liability are central issues have always been only a small
fraction of the total cases, and they may be falling. 42
38. Sreedhar T. Bharath, Venky Panchapegesan & Ingrid M. Werner, The Changing Nature of
Chapter 11, 28 (Fisher Coll. Of Bus., Working Paper No. 2008-03-003, 2010).
39. Even junior investors who invest without knowing whether other creditors prime them and
are "nonadjusting" in this sense will still in expectation receive the market return on their investments.
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in
Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 887-91 (1996). There is a huge (and often neglected) difference
between being nonadjusting and being undercompensated. The social cost of "nonadjusting" creditors,
at least when the creditors are reasonably sophisticated, is not that they fail to account for the
possibility of a secured creditor who might prime them, but rather that, in equilibrium, the level of
secured credit is too high relative to the social optimum.
40. There is an extensive literature that tries to identify such benefits, beginning with Thomas
H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J.
1143 (1979).
41. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 1, at 126.
42. The BRD includes a data field that looks at whether tort, pension liability, fraud, or
environmental liability precipitated the bankruptcy filing. They were 18% of all cases, between 1984
and 1989, but not above 10% at any other time. Since 2004, they have been less than 5%. There have
been none since 2009. This understates the problem, of course, as such liabilities can matter even when
they do not precipitate the case, but it does suggest that the problem is in decline.
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Especially in the case of prepackaged and prearranged plans, sophisticated
investors are often the only ones involved in the reorganization. The
restructuring is transparent to everyone else. They are simply paid in full as if the
bankruptcy never happened. 43 The senior investors who permit these payments,
of course, are not charitably inclined. They are merely acting in their own self-
interest. Bringing those involved in the day-to-day operations of the debtor's
business into the restructuring process makes little sense when the operational
obligations are sufficiently small. Moreover, even if these obligations are
unsecured, they may have structural priority. This happens whenever operations
are in a subsidiary and the institutional investors have debt at the parent level.
Senior lenders are better off negotiating a restructuring with institutional lenders
and paying others off, rather than running the risk of disrupting the operations of
the firm.
Rather than priority rights, control rights are what matters. The question
that should be front and center in any debate over bankruptcy reform is how
they are exercised. Residential Capital was a remarkably successful
reorganization by almost any account. It was one of the few mortgage servicers
to survive the economic collapse of 2008 and its aftermath. Nevertheless, a group
of secured creditors vehemently fought to increase their share under the plan. 44
The plan called for giving them the value of their secured claim in cash. They
asserted that they were entitled to postpetition interest as well.
These secured creditors had weak arguments on the merits, but nevertheless
spent tens of millions of dollars arguing that they were oversecured. Their
behavior was not irrational. Even if their claim was not terribly strong, $400
million was at stake. Even a 15% chance of winning makes the money spent on
litigation a positive net value investment. What matters is not so much the
priority rights themselves, but rather the need to design a system that minimizes
the cost of battling over these rights.
The issues that now dominate the Chapter 11 landscape-from going-
concern sales to claims trading-are troubling not so much in their own right, but
because they reflect weaknesses in the existing set of control rights. There are
too many places where those with their hands on the levers of control can turn
them for their own benefit in a way that is costly to the group as a whole.
LoPucki and Whitford concluded that payouts to equity were not troubling
in large part because the payouts did not disrupt the Chapter 11 process.
Managers in the course of forming the plan decided upon giving equity a share,
but this was merely a distributional question. It did not change the way they ran
43. The prepackaged Chapter 11 of the Indiana Toll Road in September 2014 provides an
illustration. See Motion of ITR Concession Company LLC, et al., for Entry of Interim and Final
Orders (A) Authorizing the Debtors to Pay Prepetition General Unsecured Claims in the Ordinary
Course of Business, (B) Directing Financial Institutions to Honor Related Checks and Electronic
Payment Requests, and (C) Granting Related Relief. In re ITR Concession Co. LLC, 2014 WL
4955941 at *5 (No. 14-34284).
44. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. UMB Bank, N.A. (In re Residential Capital,
LLC), 501 B.R. 549,555-56 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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the business or the reorganization. When there was no active equity committee,
no time was spent even litigating the question or negotiating about it.
By contrast, the valuation battles that the absolute priority rule requires are
especially costly. All measures of value are noisy.45 In a heavily tiered capital
structure, errors in measurement that are likely inevitable (perhaps 10% or so)
can spell the difference between whether a class is paid in full or entirely out of
the money. The strongest critiques of the absolute priority rule are made through
this lens, especially in the typical modern reorganization in which the only
players are sophisticated investors. Rigid insistence on absolute priority has the
effect of pitting senior and junior creditors against each other. It is not the fact of
priority among professional investors, but rather the cost of sorting it out, that
creates the most difficulty.
Alternative priority regimes have the potential to mitigate or, at least in
theory, eliminate this cost. The rules of the equity receivership have been subject
to serious criticism, sometimes for good reason, but its allocation of control
rights and the priority regime that reinforced it largely avoided the battles
common to an absolute priority regime. 46 Each class was entitled to a share of
the reorganized entity based on the option value of its stake in the business.
The reorganization itself was not a day of reckoning that collapsed future
values to the present. If an underwater interest had a chance of being paid some
day if things went well, the value of this chance would be recognized. If this value
can be established at low cost, no party has an incentive to exercise control rights
to fight for a larger share. Because their rights were fixed, junior and senior
interests each cared about maximizing the value of the business. Conflicts that
permeate modern Chapter 11 practice did not exist during the era of the equity
receivership. The same lawyer could represent senior and junior classes of
creditors in a reorganization at the same time. 47
This is not to say that we should return to the world of relative priority.
Such a regime works only if option values can be set at little cost. The idea of
recognizing option value was first revived in recent times with law-and-
economics types to whom such problems of valuation might appear easier than
they are.48 But the idea is receiving growing traction in many quarters. Indeed,
the American Bankruptcy Institute explicitly advocates the recognition of option
value in its bankruptcy reform proposals.49 Absolute priority took hold only in
the 1930s. The principal rationale for installing it and rejecting the priority
regime that preceded it was that norms and customs supplanted law to a much
greater extent than they should and that clear, hard-line rules were to be
45. See Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 533 (1986). For Black, a market was efficient if the
price at which a security traded is somewhere between half and twice its true value.
46. See Douglas G. Baird, Present at the Creation: The SEC and the Origins of the Absolute
Priority Rule, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 591 (2010).
47. See id. at 596.
48. See, e.g., Casey, supra note 35, at 764-65.
49. See AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE, COMMISSION To STUDY THE REFORM OF
CHAPTER 11: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 207-24 (2014).
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preferred. From some decades since, especially after imbibing the lessons of the
Wisconsin School, this is no longer so obvious.
